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LIST OF PARTIES 
The caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all 
parties. However, Thompson's appeal challenges only the District 
Court's Order granting Hurricane City's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
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I. JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of 
Article VIII, Sections 3 and 5 of the Constitution of Utah, Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3) and (4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j), and Rule 5 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Did the District Court correctly rule that under the 
"public duty" doctrine, Hurricane City had no duty to control a 
third party's escaped horse? 
B. Did the District Court correctly rule that no "special 
relationship" existed between Hurricane City and Mr. Thompson? 
The standard of appellate review for questions of law is 
correctness. Mountain States Tel, and Tel. Co. v. Garfield 
County, 811 P.2d 184 (Utah 1991). 
III. LAW WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
No constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, 
and/or regulations are determinative. Rather, the common law 
"public duty" doctrine is determinative. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case And Course Of Proceedings. 
Mr. Thompson was injured when his motorcycle collided with a 
stray horse. The horse was owned by Defendant Smart, and was 
corralled by Defendants Glenn. The accident occurred in a rural 
area within the Hurricane City limits on State Highway SR-9. 
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Less than an hour before the accident, the Hurricane City Clerk 
was notified that the horse was loose. Although some effort was 
made to notify the local animal control officer, Hurricane City 
made no effort to locate, and did not impound the horse prior to 
the accident. 
Mr. Thompson was a member of the general public. Prior to 
the accident, Hurricane City and Mr. Thompson had no contact with 
the other concerning the horse. Neither Mr. Thompson nor anyone 
else took any action in reliance upon any City action or 
representation regarding the horse's whereabouts or propensities. 
Mr. Thompson had no knowledge of the stray horse prior to the 
accident. The City had no knowledge that Mr. Thompson would be 
in the vicinity of the horse, or that the horse posed any 
particular threat to Mr. Thompson. The City had no basis to 
distinguish Mr. Thompson from the public at large. 
Mr. Thompson filed a negligence action against multiple 
defendants, including Hurricane City. Mr. Thompson claimed that 
Hurricane City had a duty to enforce its animal control 
ordinances and protect him from the conduct of third persons or 
their animals. Hurricane City moved for summary judgment on the 
ground that it owed Mr. Thompson no duty of care. The District 
Court granted the City's Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
ground that Hurricane City owed Mr. Thompson no duty of care. 
2 
Plaintiff Thompson's interlocutory appeal seeks review of that 
Order. 
B. Statement Of Facts. 
1. On July 13, 1990, Barry Thompson was traveling on a 
motorcycle westbound on State Highway 9 ("SR-9"). At 
approximately 1700 West State Street in Hurricane City, a horse 
owned by Defendant Smart was at large and grazing along the north 
side of SR-9. R. at 2. 
2. The horse darted across SR-9 and collided with the 
motorcycle, resulting in injuries to Mr. Thompson. R. at 2-3. 
3. Mr. Thompson does not remember anything about the 
accident. He had, however, driven through that section of road 
on many occasions ("thousands of times"), and had driven through 
it twice within an hour of the accident. Mr. Thompson was aware 
that livestock could stray onto a road and constitute a hazard to 
a motorcyclist. He testified that he would look out for 
livestock and, if he was apprehensive, would slow and perhaps 
even stop. R. at 405-06 (citing Mr. Thompson's Depo. at 37-41). 
4. The eye witness to the accident was also westbound on 
SR-9 and was passed by the motorcycle. As they approached the 
accident scene, the Plaintiff was 75-100 yards ahead of the 
witness. The witness had no difficulty seeing the horse 100 
yards away. The horse was on the north side of the road and 
appeared agitated. The motorcycle never slowed. The horse ran 
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out in front of the plaintiff's motorcycle and the collision 
occurred. R. at 407 (citing Mr. McCaul's Depo. at 10-16.) 
5. Mr. Thompson sued the horse owner, the persons charged 
with corralling the horse, the State of Utah Department of 
Transportation and the City of Hurricane. R. at 1-8. 
6. Mr. Thompson alleged that Hurricane City had a duty of 
care to erect and maintain signs along SR-9 warning drivers of 
the hazards of driving in an area where domesticated animals run 
at large. R. at 5.1 
7. Mr. Thompson also alleged that Hurricane City had a 
duty of care specifically "to Mr. Thompson to ensure that 
1Plaintiff abandoned this claim after discovery on liability 
and after Hurricane City pointed out in its Motion for Summary 
Judgment that the roadway on which the accident occurred was a 
state highway over which the Utah State Department of 
Transportation had jurisdiction. Plaintiff stated: 
During the course of discovery, Plaintiff learned that, 
although some horses had been loose in the general 
vicinity of the accident and that although animals do 
run at large within the municipal boundaries of 
Hurricane City, the problem with estray animals in the 
vicinity of the accident was not as extensive as first 
supposed. Plaintiff therefore voluntarily moved to 
dismiss the State of Utah from this action believing 
that the State was not under a duty to place warning 
signs for animals. Consistently, Plaintiff does not 
intend to defend its allegation that the City of 
Hurricane owed a duty to Plaintiff to maintain signs in 
vicinity of the accident. Plaintiff does not object to 
the Court's striking from the Complaint references to 
Hurricane's duty to maintain signs near the accident 
scene. 
R. at 610-11. 
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domesticated animals did not run at large on or about the streets 
of Hurricane City and SR-9." R. at 5. 
8. Mr. Thompson alleged that the latter duty arose by 
Hurricane City Ordinance, and that Hurricane City had a duty to 
Mr. Thompson to enforce its Ordinances. The City had ordinances 
making it unlawful for domesticated animals to run at large 
within the municipal boundaries of Hurricane City,2 and granting 
2Paragraph 3 of Appellant's Statement of Facts combines and 
rearranges selective portions of two ordinances to come up with a 
new meaning. Appellant states: 
[U]nder the Ordinance, any "owner or person charged 
with responsibility for an animal found running at 
large" was strictly liable for "all damages incurred by 
anyone whose person . . . ha[d] been injured" by the 
loose animal "regardless of the precautions taken to 
prevent the escape of the animal and regardless of 
whether or not he kn[e]w that the animal [was] running 
at large." 
(Appellant's Brief, f 3, p. 2.) 
The Ordinances instead read as follows: 
2. Animals Running at Large: It shall be unlawful 
for the owner or custodian of any animal . . . to allow 
such animals at any time to run at large. The owner or 
person charged with responsibility for an animal found 
running at large shall be strictly liable for a 
violation of this section regardless of the precautions 
taken to prevent the escape of the animal and 
regardless of whether or not he knows that the animal 
is running at large. 
R. at 642 (§ 13-247(2)). 
Any person violating the provisions of this ordinance . 
. . shall be subject to the following: 
(continued...) 
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authority to local officials to impound such animals and 
otherwise enforce the ordinances.3 R. at 613, 635-52, 
9. On motion of Hurricane City, the District Court ordered 
that discovery commence and be had on the issue of liability 
only, so that defendants or some of them could file dispositive 
motions, and those who were not liable as a matter of law would 
2(...continued) 
3. Restitution of the cost of all damages incurred by 
anyone who's person, property or animal has been 
injured or destroyed . . . . 
R. at 651 (§ 13-257(3)). 
Thus, the "strict liability" imposed by § 13-247(2) was for 
criminal violation of the Ordinance, not for tort liability, and 
the restitution identified in § 13-257(3) was a form of criminal 
penalty or sanction, not tort liability. 
Then, in Paragraph 4 of Appellant's Statement of Facts, 
Appellant selectively uses only a portion of § 13-247(2) to reach 
the conclusion that a municipal poundmaster somehow qualifies as 
a person "charged with responsibility for an animal found running 
at large . . . ." (Appellant's Brief, f 4, p. 3.) Read in full 
context, however, that Ordinance imposes criminal liability for 
owners and custodians of stray animals, and not tort liability on 
the people who are responsible for enforcing the law and 
impounding estray animals. 
3The Ordinance created an office of poundmaster, and at the 
time of Mr. Thompson's accident the chief of police served as ex 
officio poundmaster because no poundmaster had been appointed. 
R. at 613, 635. The Ordinance also created a division of animal 
control within the police department, appointed the chief of 
police director, allowed the chief of police to receive the 
assistance of any peace officer or animal control officer as he 
may designate, and gave the director the charge to enforce animal 
control ordinances and supervise animal control officers. R. at 
613, 639. 
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not have to incur the expense of conducting discovery on damages. 
R. at 201-02, 218-19, 223-24. 
10. Discovery revealed that Hurricane City first received 
notice that a horse was loose at approximately 8:30 a.m. the day 
of the accident. At that time, an unknown motorist passing 
through the drive-up window at the City offices told Virginia 
Pectol, the City Clerk, that a horse was loose.4 The Clerk 
attempted several times to contact the animal control officer 
both by phone and radio, but was unsuccessful. In the meantime, 
the accident occurred. R. at 694-96. 
11. Mrs. Pectol, in accordance with established procedure, 
attempted to contact the animal control officer by calling the 
Washington County Central Dispatch. She called dispatch two or 
three times, but the line was busy. She also tried to contact 
the animal control officer directly by radio and called him at 
home, but there was no answer. In between, she was attempting to 
perform her usual functions in the City office. Thus, it is 
Appellant states: "It is reasonable to assume that other 
people in Hurricane City did not remove Defendant Smart's loose 
horse because they knew it had been reported to the Hurricane 
City offices and Hurricane City police had an animal control 
division that removed large, stray animals." Appellant's Brief, 
p. 6 n.5. Such an assertion is the wildest of speculation. 
There is no evidence whatsoever that other people knew the horse 
was loose, or that it had been reported, or that others would 
have removed the horse, or that others failed to take steps to 
remove the horse because it had been reported. Even if such 
evidence existed, however, it would not place upon Hurricane City 
a duty to Mr. Thompson to control the conduct of third persons 
under the "public duty" doctrine. 
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questionable whether her conduct was in any way unreasonable or 
negligent, and it is speculative whether prompt contact with the 
officer would have resulted in a different outcome. For purposes 
of the Summary Judgment Motion only, however, Hurricane City 
assumed, arguendo, that Mrs. Pectol could have done more and that 
it would have made a difference. R. at 404, 694-96. 
12. The accident occurred at approximately 9:10 a.m., July 
13, 1990. R. at 617. 
13. There is no evidence that the Thompsons had any 
communication with the City or its agents about the horse before 
the accident. Mr. Thompson's actions prior to the accident were 
not taken in reliance upon any conduct or representations by any 
City officer or employee relating to the horse. R. at 404-05. 
14. No evidence exists that the City had any notice that 
Mr. Thompson himself would be in the vicinity of the horse, or 
that the horse posed a particular threat to Mr. Thompson. In 
short, there was no notice to the City whatsoever to distinguish 
Mr. Thompson from the public at large. See R. at 420. 
15. On July 30, 1992, the District Court granted the City's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that "the public duty 
doctrine is applicable to the plaintiffs' claims against the City 
of Hurricane and that no facts exist from which it could be found 
than any special relationship existed between plaintiffs and the 
defendant City of Hurricane." The District Court certified the 
8 
Order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. R. at 788-89. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A negligence action may be maintained only if there is a 
duty of care. The existence of a duty is a question of law for 
the court. 
The "public duty" doctrine, which is well recognized in Utah 
law, bars Mr. Thompson's negligence claim against Hurricane City. 
The "public duty" doctrine provides that the governmental agency 
has only a general duty to the public to enforce its laws, but 
has no such duty to an individual member of the public absent a 
showing of a "special relationship" between the agency and the 
individual. The government does not insure against conduct of 
third persons. 
Mr. Thompson cannot establish an exception to the "public 
duty" doctrine based on a "special relationship" with Mr. 
Thompson. Under Utah law, Mr. Thompson would have to show (1) 
inducement by the City and reliance by Mr. Thompson, or (2) that 
the City had reason to distinguish him from the general public, 
or (3) that he somehow had set himself apart from the general 
public. Mr. Thompson could not show any of the three. 
Mr. Thompson tries to avoid application of the "public duty" 
doctrine by arguing that Hurricane City's failure to impound the 
third party's horse was a breach of a duty to maintain its 
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physical facilities (i.e., the State road). However, the duty 
associated with physical facilities is not here implicated; 
rather, the necessity of controlling the conduct of third persons 
is implicated. A person has no duty to prevent another from 
acting negligently absent a custodial relationship. Nor does one 
have a duty to protect another from the negligent or illegal acts 
of a third person absent a "special relationship." 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. Under The "Public Duty" Doctrine. Hurricane City Owed 
Mr. Thompson No Duty Of Care. 
1. A Duty Of Care Is An Essential Element Of 
Plaintiff's Negligence Claim Against Hurricane 
City. 
A negligence action may be maintained only if there is a 
duty or obligation, recognized by law, which requires the 
defendant to conform to a particular standard of conduct in order 
to protect another against unreasonable risks of harm. Lamarr v. 
Utah State Dept. of Transp.. 828 P.2d 535, 537 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992) ("Establishing the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of 
care is '[a]n essential element of a negligence claim1"); Reeves 
v. Gentile. 813 P.2d 111, 116 (Utah 1991) (elements of negligence 
include "the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty"); Loveland v. 
Orem City Corp.. 746 P.2d 763, 765-66 (Utah 1987) ("It is 
axiomatic that one may not be liable to another in tort absent a 
duty"). 
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As Dean Prosser explained, a "duty" in negligence cases is 
defined as an obligation to which the law gives recognition and 
effect to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward 
another. W. Prosser & W. Keaton, Prosser and Keaton On Torts § 
53# 356 (5th ed. 1984). An actor must bring himself within the 
scope of a definite legal obligation so that it is regarded as 
personal to him. "[N]egligence in the air, so to speak, will not 
do." Id. at 357 (citations omitted). 
2. The Question Of The Existence Of A Duty Is Solely 
For The Court. 
The existence of a duty is a question to be decided by the 
court. E.g., Lamarr v. Utah State Dept. of Transp., 828 P.2d 
535, 538 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("Whether the defendant owed the 
plaintiff a duty of care is 'entirely a question of law to be 
determined by the court'") (quoting Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 
149, 151 (Utah 1989)). This means that the court must decide: 
Whether, upon the facts in evidence, such a relation 
exists between the parties that the community will 
impose a legal obligation upon one for the benefit of 
the other—or, more simply, whether the interest of the 
plaintiff which has suffered invasion was entitled to a 
legal protection at the hands of the defendant. This 
is entirely a question of law, to be determined by 
reference to the body of statutes, rules, principles 
and precedents which make up the law; it must be 
determined only by the court. 
W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 37, 206 (4th ed. 1971). 
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3. The "Public Duty" Doctrine Bars Plaintiff's Claim 
Of A Duty Of Care, 
Appellant Thompson asks this Court to abandon or overturn a 
long history of Utah law and recent Utah appellate court 
decisions. In a trilogy of recent cases, this Court and the Utah 
Supreme Court reaffirmed the existence and parameters of the 
"public duty" doctrine. Ferree v. State. 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 
1989); Rollins v. Peterson, 813 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1989); Lamarr v. 
Utah State Dept. of Transp., 828 P.2d 535 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
The "public duty" doctrine provides that the governmental 
agency has a general duty to enforce its laws, but has no such 
duty to any individual member of the public absent a showing of a 
"special relationship" between the agency and the individual. 
The government agency does not insure against conduct of third 
persons. As this Court explained: 
For a governmental agency and its agents to be liable 
for negligently caused injuries suffered by a member of 
the public, the plaintiff must show a breach of a duty 
owed him as an individual, not merely the breach of an 
obligation owed to the general public at large by the 
governmental official. 
Lamarr v. Utah State Dept. of Transp., 828 P.2d 535, 537 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 
1989)) . 
The Ferree Court explained the policy for the "public duty" 
doctrine in the context of a "custodial" case. An inmate, on 
release from a correction center, had committed murder and the 
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victim's family blamed corrections officials for not controlling 
the conduct of a third-party inmate under their charge: 
To adopt plaintiffs' theories would impose too broad a 
duty of care on the part of corrections officers toward 
individual members of the public. It would expose the 
state to potentially every wrong that flows from the 
necessary programs of rehabilitation and paroling of 
prisoners. Given the increases in prison populations, 
the effect could well be to burden corrections 
officials and chill legitimate rehabilitative programs. 
Parole and probation programs are subject to occasional 
tragic failures because of the frailties of human 
nature and the imprecision associated with predicting 
violent human conduct, but they are also practically 
indispensable. The public interest would not be served 
by imposing liability on corrections officials and the 
state for the uncertain success that attends parole and 
probation programs. . . . 
Ferguson and the victim were apparently unknown to each 
other. In short, officials had no duty of due care to the 
victim apart from their general duty to the public at large. 
Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). 
The Rollins Court confirmed that a state custodian of a 
mental patient had no duty to protect any specific member of the 
public from that patient, absent a showing of special relation 
between the agency and the injured individual. The Court 
carefully analyzed the doctrine of "special relationship" as an 
exception to the "public duty" doctrine and found that no such 
relationship existed: 
In Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 
1986), . . . we described as essentially pragmatic the 
approach we would take in dealing with claims that 
special relationships existed which gave rise to 
consequent duties: 
13 
Determining whether one party has an 
affirmative duty to protect another . . . 
requires a careful consideration of the 
consequences for the parties and society at 
large. If the duty is realistically 
incapable of performance, or if it is 
fundamentally at odds with the nature of the 
parties' relationship, we should be loath to 
term that relationship "special" and to 
impose a resulting "duty," for it is 
meaningless to speak of "special 
relationships" and "duties" in the abstract. 
These terms are only labels which the legal 
system applies to defined situations to 
indicate that certain rights and obligations 
flow from them; they are "an expression of 
the sum total of those considerations of 
policy which lead the law to say that a 
particular plaintiff is entitled to 
protection." . . . . 
We concluded in Ferree that if the officials had reason 
to believe that a detainee presented a danger to a 
particular third person, a special relation, and hence 
a duty, might be established apart from a generalized 
duty to protect the public at large. However, we found 
that no such showing had been made in Ferree. 
Rollins v. Peterson, 813 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1989) (quoting Beach v. 
University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 418 (Utah 1986)). 
The Rollins Court concluded that because the injured person 
was not reasonably identifiable to the hospital, or 
distinguishable from the public at large, no "special 
relationship" could arise and the hospital owed him no duty. The 
Court explained pragmatic policy reasons for its conclusion. 
Absent a reason to believe that a third person under the 
hospital's charge presented a danger to a particular person (as 
distinguished from the public at large), imposing liability would 
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have a crippling effect on custodial programs and would invoke 
unlimited exposure, making them "virtual insurers" of third 
parties1 conduct: "the duty [proposed] is realistically incapable 
of performance [and] • . . it is fundamentally at odds with the 
notions of the parties' relationship." 813 P.2d at 1161-62. 
Finally, this Court addressed the "public duty" doctrine in 
LamarrP the most recent of the trilogy, and the most closely 
analogous to this case. In Lamarr, the plaintiff was struck by a 
car while he was walking east across the North Temple overpass. 
Prior to the accident, he had walked west across the overpass 
using a pedestrian walkway that ended under the overpass. He was 
frightened and harassed by transients who had congregated under 
the overpass, so on the return trip, he walked along the roadway 
where he was struck by a car. Among other things, he claimed 
that the city negligently failed to take affirmative steps to 
"control" the conduct of third parties—the transient population 
under the overpass. The District Court granted the city's motion 
for summary judgment, holding that the city owed Lamarr no 
private or personalized duty to "control" the transient 
population and that the city's conduct was otherwise an immune 
discretionary function under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(a). 
Relying heavily on Ferree v. State. 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 
1989) and Rollins v. Peterson. 813 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1989), this 
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Court affirmed the order of summary judgment. The Court 
explained: 
The public duty doctrine has been defined as "a duty to 
all is a duty to none." Thus, if the City owed no duty 
to Lamarr apart from its duty to the general public, 
Lamarr cannot recover. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently explained the 
parameters of Utah's public duty Doctrine. In Ferree, 
the court applied the public duty doctrine holding 
state corrections officials were not liable when a 
prison inmate on weekend release murdered Dean Ferree. 
The court concluded the officials had only a general 
duty to the public, not a private duty to Ferree, and 
therefore owed Ferree no duty of care. Moreover, in 
Rollins, the court affirmed the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment because under the public duty 
doctrine, the State did not owe a duty to protect the 
decedent from a state hospital patient. The court 
specifically noted the decedent "was simply a member of 
the public, no more distinguishable to the hospital 
than to any other person." 
828 P.2d at 539 (some citations omitted).5 
Examining the facts before it in light of Ferree and 
Rollins, the Lamarr Court stated: 
Based on the preceding authority, Lamarr must establish 
the City owed him a "special duty." We conclude Lamarr 
5Lamarr contended that the "public duty" doctrine was 
abrogated by legislative waiver of certain immunities under the 
Governmental Immunity Act. This Court, and the Utah Supreme 
Court, have rejected that argument. The Lamarr Court explained 
that the "public duty" doctrine is a creature of common law and 
addresses the issue of the existence of a government agency's 
duty in the first instance. (The Governmental Immunity Act 
addresses a conceptually different issue.) Unless a defendant 
owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, liability cannot attach. 
If liability cannot attach, there is no need to reach the issue 
of immunity. Therefore, the Governmental Immunity Act left the 
"public duty doctrine" undisturbed. 828 P.2d at 539 and n.4 
(citing Ferree, 784 P.2d at 152-53). 
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has failed to establish the City owed him any duty of 
care beyond that owed the general public. There is no 
evidence in the record the City had any reason to 
distinguish Lamarr from the general pubic. Like the 
decedent in Rollins, Lamarr "had not set himself apart" 
from the general public such that any special duty 
arose between himself and the City. In fact, there is 
no evidence the City had any knowledge whatsoever of 
either of Lamarr's trips across the overpass. 
Id. at 540. 
To emphasize that liability will not attach absent the 
existence of a special duty to the individual (as distinguished 
from the general duty to the public), the Lamarr Court contrasted 
the facts before it with a case in which a special duty had been 
found to exist. The Court stated: 
This conclusion is also supported by the [S]upreme 
[C]ourt's decision in Little v. Utah State Division of 
Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983). In that 
case, the court held that once a State agency took 
custody of an autistic child and placed the child in a 
foster home, the agency assumed a duty of due care to 
the child. Id. at 51. It was only after the agency 
had knowledge of the child's condition and assumed 
custody of the child, however, that the special 
relationship arose between the agency and the child. 
Id. 
Id. at 540 n.5. 
Similarly, in Stout v. City of Porterville. 148 Cal. App. 3d 
937, 296 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1983), quoted in Christenson v. Hayward, 
694 P.2d 612 (Utah 1984), the court explained circumstances 
whereby a special relationship could arise: 
The only additional duty undertaken by accepting 
employment as a police officer is the duty owed to the 
public at large. . . . 
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Appellants did not allege that [the officer] assured 
Michael Stout he would take care of him or by his words 
or conduct induced him to rely on the officer's 
protection. Appellants did not allege that the officer 
in any way induced him into a false sense of security. 
In sum, appellants failed to allege a common law legal 
duty owed to them by the City and/or [the officer]. 
Numerous additional cases and authorities hold that under 
facts similar to those herein, the policy reasons underlying the 
"public duty" doctrine bar a plaintiff's claims against a 
government agency. The government is not to be the scapegoat, 
nor an insurer against a third-party's conduct.6 
60wens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1989) (County owed 
no duty to child injured by babysitter who was under 
investigation for abuse); Christenson v. Havward, 694 P.2d 612 
(Utah 1984) (statutory duties to "preserve the peace" and "make 
all lawful arrests" are owed to public and not to particular 
individuals; officers not liable for failure to arrest 
intoxicated motorcyclist who was later killed); White v. State of 
Utah, 579 P.2d 921 (Utah 1978) (State's failure properly to 
inspect under OSHA would not create liability; "The legislature . 
. . had no intention of making [the State] the scapegoat for 
every industrial accident"); Obrey v. Malmberg, 26 Utah 2d 17, 
484 P.2d 160 (1971) (sheriff's failure to investigate burglary 
not actionable); Carter v. City of Stuart, 468 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 
1985) (city was immune from liability for failing to impound 
dangerous dog that was running at large: "The judicial branch 
should not trespass into the decisional process of [the executive 
function in enforcing laws]"); Christopher v. Bavnton, 141 Mich. 
App. 309, 367 N.W.2d 378 (1985) (failure to enforce dog ordinance 
not actionable); Maxwell v. Audoban Park Comm'n for the City of 
New Orleans, 482 So. 2d 104 (La. App. 1986) (failure to enforce 
leash ordinance and reduce stray dog problem not actionable in 
claim where plaintiff's bicycle collided with dog); Lundaren v. 
City of McCall, 817 P.2d 1080 (Idaho 1991) (city owed no duty to 
protect individual plaintiff from illegal fireworks being set off 
by celebrants, despite fact that officers knew of fireworks and 
failed to enforce fireworks ordinance); see also 63 C.J.S. 
Municipal Corporations § 752 ("A municipality is not liable for 
the mere failure to prevent an act or condition which, in the 
(continued...) 
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4. No Special Duty To Mr. Thompson Existed. 
Citing cases from other jurisdictions (Colorado, California, 
Pennsylvania, Alaska, New York, Kansas), Plaintiff contends that 
a special relationship arose because the City took some action to 
notify authorities of the stray horse and thereby "assumed" a 
duty (where one did not exist before) .7 However, under Utah law, 
this is not sufficient to establish a special relationship where 
the Plaintiff was not induced by the City's conduct, in no way 
relied on the City's conduct, and otherwise did not distinguish 
himself from the general public. Plaintiff's argument reaches 
the ironic conclusion that had the City simply ignored altogether 
any complaint about the stray horse, the City would have had no 
duty. 
(...continued) 
exercise of its police power or government functions it might 
have prevented, as in the case of failure to enact or enforce 
ordinances"); E. McQuillin, 18 The Law of Municipal Corporations 
§ 53.80 (3d ed. and Supp. 1992) ("it is not liable for failure of 
policemen to perform their duty to protect private persons or 
property against a known violation of law. So it is not liable 
for the negligence of policemen in failing . . . to prevent 
cattle running at large about the city or town"); cases cited at 
Annot., Liability of Municipality or Other Governmental Unit For 
Failure to Provide Police Protection, 46 A.L.R. 3d (1972 and 
Supp. 1992); cases cited at Annot., Failure to Restrain Drunk 
Driver as Ground of Liability of State or Local Government Unit 
or Officer, 48 A.L.R. 4th 320 (1986 and Supp. 1992). 
7The City's conduct, however, never made it to the 
"assumption" stage because no effort was actually made to locate 
or impound the horse. 
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Appellant cannot establish an exception to the "public duty" 
doctrine based on a special duty to Mr. Thompson. Utah case law 
has clearly identified the circumstances by which the special 
duty exception arises. Mr. Thompson would have to show (1) 
inducement by the City and reliance by Mr. Thompson, (2) that the 
City had reason to distinguish him from the general public, or 
(3) that he somehow had set himself apart from the general 
public. Ferree v. State. 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989); Rollins v. 
Peterson, 813 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1989); Lamarr v. Utah State Dept. 
of Transp., 828 P.2d 535 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Christenson v. 
Hayward, 694 P.2d 612 (Utah 1984); Little v. Utah State Division 
of Family Services. 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983). 
Mr. Thompson was simply a member of the public, no more 
distinguishable to the City than any other person. No evidence 
exists that the City had any reason to distinguish Mr. Thompson 
from the general public, or that he had somehow set himself apart 
from the general public. Specifically, the City had no notice 
that Mr. Thompson personally would be in the vicinity of the 
horse, and had no notice that the horse posed any threat to Mr. 
Thompson. Mr. Thompson did not communicate with the City 
concerning the horse; and, Mr. Thompson took no action in 
reliance upon any specific City action or any City representation 
of the horse's whereabouts or propensities. The City had no 
basis to distinguish Mr. Thompson from the public at large. The 
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City's failure to remedy a condition created by third parties, 
(such as harassment by transients or a grazing horse along a 
State highway) does not create a duty specific to an individual. 
The duty is to the public and not to individuals. 
Moreover, Mr. Thompson's proposed duty is "realistically 
incapable of performance [and] . . . it is fundamentally at odds 
with the notions of the parties' relationship." Appellant's 
theory "would impose too broad a duty of care" on cities and 
towns in this State simply by virtue of their animal control 
ordinances. It would require that government agencies accurately 
predict human and animal conduct not under their control. Rural 
cities and towns would become the virtual insurers of every foot 
of the miles of stock pens, corrals and fences enclosing 
livestock located within city limits. It would presumably 
require the cities to maintain such fences to prevent the escape 
of any animal, even non-dangerous animals like the horse in this 
case, or dogs, cats, chickens, etc., any of which could cause a 
motorcycle accident, without any notice that the animal posed a 
risk to any particular person. 
5. Mr. Thompson Was Not Within A Group Identifiable 
From The General Public. 
Plaintiff also tries to establish a "special relationship" 
by claiming that although the City had no reason to distinguish 
Mr. Thompson himself from the general public, he fell within an 
"identifiable group." Plaintiff misapplies the concept. This 
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notion arose in the Rollins case, which involved a custodial 
relationship between a mental hospital and a patient. The mental 
patient had stolen a car and caused an accident which resulted in 
another1s death, and the Court was faced with defining the added 
duties arising out of the custodial relationship in light of the 
"public duty" doctrine. 
The Court explained: 
Before any duty is imposed to protect others from 
bodily harm caused by one under control of the state, 
the "others" to whom such bodily harm is "likely" and 
in favor of whom the duty arises must be reasonably 
identifiable by the custodian either individually or as 
members of a distinct group. Generally, for a person 
or group to be reasonably identifiable, the bodily harm 
caused will be of the type that the custodian knew or 
should have known the detainee was likely to cause if 
not controlled. And here we emphasize that the term is 
"likely" to cause, not "might" cause. 
813 P.2d 1156, 1162. In other words, (1) a "custodian"—someone 
who has responsibility for another—may have a duty to protect a 
third person from the person under custody if (2) the third 
person is reasonably identifiable individually or as a member of 
a "distinct group" and (3) the harm is "likely" to occur—the 
"detainee" was "likely" to cause that specific harm if not 
controlled. The Rollins Court concluded that the accident victim 
was not reasonably identifiable to the custodian either 
individually or as a member of a distinct group. 
In this case, the City did not own the horse and was not 
responsible for corralling the horse. There was no custodial 
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relationship between the City and the horse which would impose 
the added burden on the City to identify Mr. Thompson as a member 
of a "distinct group" that would "likely" incur harm. That is 
the only relationship out of which this type of duty could arise. 
Moreover, even if the "custodial" standard were to apply in 
this case, Mr. Thompson was no more identifiable to the City as 
an individual or as a member of a distinct group than was Mr. 
Lamarr, who was struck by a car while trying to avoid harassment 
by transients. Any general member of the public could have been 
using the roadways at issue or could have been injured in some 
other way by the horse. Again, as the Lamarr Court explained: 
Lamarr has failed to establish the City owed him any 
duty of care beyond that owed the general public. 
There is no evidence in the record the City had any 
reason to distinguish Lamarr from the general public. 
Like the decedent in Rollins, Lamarr "had not set 
himself apart" from the general public such that any 
special duty arose between himself and the City. In 
fact, there is no evidence the City had any knowledge 
whatsoever of either of Lamarr's trips across the 
overpass. 
828 P.2d at 540. 
B. Hurricane City's Duty To Maintain Its Physical 
Facilities Is Not Implicated By The Facts. 
Appellant Thompson tries to avoid application of the "public 
duty doctrine" by arguing that Hurricane City's failure to 
impound the third party's horse was a breach of some duty to 
maintain its physical facilities. Plaintiff cites three cases in 
support of this argument; each, however, involved the failure to 
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maintain actual physical facilities (i.e., city streets or 
sidewalks) rather than the control of less predictable third-
party conduct. The facts of this case are easily distinguished 
from those circumstances, and strong policy reasons militate 
against extending such a duty to the present situation. 
In Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982), the 
City had conducted road maintenance but had failed to inspect 
signs where the work had been done. A stop sign was missing 
which resulted in an accident. In Ingram v. Salt Lake City. 733 
P.2d 126 (Utah 1987), Ingram was injured when he stepped on a 
defective manhole cover located in an area where the City had 
undertaken a beautification program. In Trapp v. Salt Lake City. 
190 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Utah July 7, 1992), a case involving a 
defective city sidewalk, the Court drew the distinction between 
maintenance of a physical facility and control of third persons. 
The Court explained: 
Salt Lake City argues, that it has no duty because it 
had no special relationship to Trapp. . . . These 
special relationship cases, however, have no 
application to the present case. They address whether 
and under what circumstances one party owes another 
party a duty to protect that party from his or her own 
acts or from the acts of a third party. In the special 
relationship cases, people, not physical facilities, 
are the things that must be "controlled" if the duty 
exists. Because people are inherently less 
controllable than physical things, the common law has 
imposed no duty to control the conduct of others except 
in certain circumstances, as where a special 
relationship exists. . . . The present case does not 
involve the duty to control an independent actor; 
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rather, it involves a duty to maintain physical 
facilities. . . • 
This duty seems generally grounded in the common law 
principle that one who has control over a physical 
facility has an obligation to keep it in a safe 
condition. 
Id. at 28-29. 
Hurricane City does not quarrel with the proposition that it 
has a duty to maintain its streets and sidewalks. However, the 
City should not have a legal duty to prevent someone else from 
acting negligently. It has no duty to protect one from the 
negligent or illegal acts of another absent a special 
relationship.8 The City's only duty in that context is to the 
general public under the "public duty11 doctrine. 
°See Gray v. Scott, 565 P.2d 76, 78 (Utah 1977) (no duty to 
foresee criminal acts of third party); Owens v. Garfield, 784 
P.2d 1187 (Utah 1989) (no duty to control conduct of third person 
absent special custodial relationship); Davis v. Manaelsdorf, 138 
Ariz. 207, 673 P.2d 951 (Ariz App. 1983) (no duty to control 
conduct of third person absent special custodial relationship); 
Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 
763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988) (no duty to protect 
another from harm absent special relationship), cert, denied, 490 
U.S. 1007 (1989); Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986) (no 
duty to prevent third party from harming another absent special 
custodial relationship); Calkins v. Cox Estates, 110 N.M. 59, 792 
P.2d 36 (1990) (for duty to arise, plaintiff must show that 
relationship existed by which defendant was legally obligated to 
protect interest of plaintiff); Torres v. United States Nat'l 
Bank of Oregon, 65 Or. App. 207, 670 P.2d 230 (an individual is 
under no duty to protect another from the wrongful acts of a 
third party, and may reasonably proceed on the assumption that 
others will obey the law), rev, denied, 296 Or. 237, 675 P.2d 491 
(1983); Cox v. Malcolm, 60 Wash. App. 894, 808 P.2d 758 (no duty 
to prevent third party from causing physical injury to another), 
rev, denied, 117 Wash. 1014, 816 P.2d 1224 (1991). 
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Imposing a duty on the City in this circumstance would go 
well beyond the standards of the law of negligence and 
reasonableness and would not be in the interests of justice or 
public policy. As discussed above, such a standard "would impose 
too broad a duty of care" on cities and towns in this State 
simply by virtue of their animal control ordinances. Rural 
cities and towns would become the virtual insurers of what occurs 
on its streets, even though caused by the acts or neglect of 
third parties over whom the City has no control. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Unless cities are to become the insurers of the negligent 
conduct of their citizens, the Order of the District Court 
granting Hurricane City summary judgment should be affirmed. 
DATED this 1 day of February, 1993. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Allan L. Larsdn^^ ^ 
Richard A. Van Wagoner / 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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ORDER AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 910500127 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
Thel Motion for Summary Judgment of the defendant City of Hurricane coming 
on regularly for hearing before the Honorable J. Philip Eves on July 13, 1992, and 
the parties having previously filed their respective memoranda of points and 
authorities in support of and in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, 
and the Court having ordered the filing and publication of all depositions taken in 
connection with this matter, and the Court having reviewed the depositions, 
affidavits, memoranda and pleadings on file herein, and argument having been 
/ o « o l 
heard, and the Court being fully advised in the premises and being of the opinion 
that the public duty doctrine is applicable to the plaintiffs1 claims against the City 
of Hurricane and that no facts exist from which it could be found that any special 
relationship existed between the plaintiffs and the defendant City of Hurricane, 
and good cause otherwise appearing therefor, it is hereby 
ORDERED that the motion of the defendant City of Hurricane is hereby 
granted and it is further 
QRDERED that the Court hereby expressly determines that there is no just 
reason for delay and this Order and Summary Judgment is hereby determined to 
be a final order and accordingly this Order and Summary Judgment is an express 
direction for the entry of judgment in favor of the defendant Hurricane City 
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and it is further 
#RDERED that summary judgment is hereby entered in favor of the City of 
Hurricane and against the plaintiffs, no cause of action, defendant to recover 
costs• 
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